Weapons of Ukraine’s Victory: FP-1 – A Drone Capable of Reaching Moscow

Today we will look at the FP-1 UAV, a relatively controversial system developed by the company Fire Point. This overview is based strictly on available factual information, without subjective interpretation or emotional assessment.

On the night of 4 May 2026, debris with the Ukrainian-language inscription “Do not touch! Moving part” appeared on Mosfilmovskaya Street in Moscow, about 6 kilometers from the Kremlin and roughly 3 kilometers from the Russian Ministry of Defense building. OSINT analysts from the Exilenova+ channel identified the wreckage as belonging to a full-scale FP-1 strike UAV.

This occurred five days before the 9 May military parade. It also came exactly three years after May 2023, when drones reportedly detonated over the dome of the Senate Palace in the Kremlin. At the time, these were described as a “private initiative” carried out by unknown actors. Now, the systems are presented as serially produced industrial weapons, bearing Ukrainian-language markings and an identifiable manufacturer.

The difference between these two moments is not only technical progress. It also reflects the transition from improvised prototype systems to industrial-scale production capable of manufacturing hundreds of units per day.

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Background: how this became possible

To understand what happened that night, it is necessary to consider the broader context, which is more unusual than typical military reporting.

Fire Point was founded in late 2022. Its origins were not in traditional defense industry backgrounds – no long-term veterans of aerospace corporations such as Lockheed Martin or Ukraine’s defense conglomerate “Ukroboronprom.” Instead, the team reportedly included civilian engineers, architects, game designers, and, according to some accounts, a former casting agency involved in recruitment for advertising productions.

One of the company’s technical leads, Iryna Terekh, became the subject of an anecdotal remark within engineering circles after a prototype appeared in a pink color. This was the result of a practical decision during early testing: when red paint ran out, an alternative color was used to make recovered debris easier to identify after test flights.

In three and a half years, the team has reportedly built an enterprise with contracts exceeding $1 billion annually, around 30 classified production sites across the country, and a production rate of more than 100 drones per day.

According to Defense Express estimates, during a single strike on the Krasnozavodsk chemical plant in the summer of 2025, up to seven impacts were recorded. The FP-1 was also identified in that case, based on its distinctive design features, including a straight, wide wing and a narrow fuselage.

This is not a typical startup success story. It represents the emergence of a new defense industry formed during an active conflict.

What FP-1 actually is and why it appears where it does

The FP-1 is a long-range, single-use strike UAV. Its design is intentionally simple: a load-bearing structure made from plywood, CNC-laser cut components, a lightweight external skin, a two-cylinder piston engine with a propeller, and a solid-fuel booster used for launch from an inclined ramp.

The wingspan is approximately 2.5 meters. The warhead is modular, with a payload ranging from 50 to 120 kg, and can be either high-explosive fragmentation or shaped-charge. The stated range is up to 1,600 km.

Moscow is located roughly 900–1,000 km from the front line, depending on the route. In that sense, the FP-1’s stated range is sufficient.

However, range is only part of the equation. The more important aspect is how that range is achieved. Navigation is based on inertial systems with satellite correction and protection against GPS spoofing and electronic warfare interference. Fire Point reportedly produces its own CRPA antennas, which are a key component for resistance to electronic warfare and were previously imported. This represents a strategic decision: in-house production of a critical component reduces dependence on external suppliers in one of the most sensitive parts of the system.

That night, the drone reportedly maneuvered over the city at very low altitude. This is likely one of the reasons why parts of the air defense system either did not engage or reacted with a delay.

In footage filmed over the Moscow suburb of Drozhzhino, the FP-1 can be seen flying over residential areas. There is no visible radio signal and no jet-like acoustic signature typical of fast aerial targets. The passage appears visually quiet, with minimal detectable noise.

FP-1 Technical Specifications

Range: up to 1,600 km (depending on warhead mass; lighter payloads allow maximum range).
Warhead mass: 50–60 kg in standard configuration, up to 113–120 kg at maximum load. Modular warhead design, including high-explosive fragmentation or shaped-charge options.
Wingspan: approximately 2.5–5 m (varies by source; baseline configuration uses straight-wing layout).
Fuselage length: about 3.5 m.
Propulsion: twin-cylinder piston engine with a propeller, chosen for simplicity and cost efficiency compared to more complex four-cylinder engines used in systems such as Shahed-type UAVs.
Launch method: inclined ramp with a solid-fuel booster; no wheeled landing gear.
Airframe design: simplified for mass production, with a plywood load-bearing structure, composite elements, and radar-absorbing materials. The absence of non-essential finishing is a deliberate choice to reduce cost and accelerate manufacturing.
Navigation: inertial navigation system with satellite correction, including algorithms designed to resist GPS spoofing and electronic warfare interference. Optical stations are used for image transmission.
Flight profile: low-altitude flight profile with long endurance, with operational duration exceeding 12 hours.

The design is focused on mass production: simple assembly, readily available materials, and a minimal number of imported components. This approach enables production at a scale of thousands of units per month, approaching the output rates of Russian “Shahed”-type systems.

Plywood as a weapon: the logic of materials

The most unusual aspect of the FP-1 remains its airframe material. Plywood is not an improvised compromise of a resource-limited country, but a deliberate design choice. This decision should be understood in a technical rather than symbolic context.

For a single-use kamikaze drone designed for one-way flight ending in detonation, long-term structural durability is not a relevant requirement. CNC-laser-cut plywood provides sufficient strength for a single mission while significantly reducing production cost. A single FP-1 is estimated to cost around $55,000. By comparison, the Iranian “Shahed” drone, which it is often compared to on the battlefield, was estimated in 2023 to cost about $193,000 – roughly 3.5 times more expensive.

At a production rate of 100 units per day, this implies the ability to apply continuous pressure on targets deep within Russian territory, while spending significantly fewer resources than the adversary does on producing comparable systems.

At the same time, the “low cost” of the FP-1 does not imply simplicity in terms of capability. The airframe incorporates radar-absorbing materials to reduce detectability. The antenna system is protected against electronic warfare interference. The warhead is modular and can be configured depending on the target type. In this sense, it is not a “cheap improvised device” in the trivial meaning of the term, but rather a system designed to perform a specific function efficiently, without unnecessary complexity or cost.

Moscow air defense: where it stands

The air defense system around Moscow is considered one of the densest in the world. It includes S-400 systems, Pantsir units, radar posts, and electronic warfare systems. In the days leading up to the 9 May parade, additional air defense assets are also reportedly deployed to the capital. Despite this layered defense network, the FP-1 reportedly passed through it and was found approximately 6 km from the Kremlin.

Part of this can be explained by tactics. FP-1 flight paths are not necessarily linear. The drone can approach from unexpected directions and operate at very low altitudes, where radar coverage is traditionally less effective. Its navigation system is designed to be resistant to jamming attempts. Importantly, Russia concentrates air defense assets around Moscow in preparation for the 9 May parade, which may reduce coverage in other regions.

The redeployment of air defense systems toward the capital ahead of 9 May, combined with the timing of the FP-1 incident, may therefore be more than coincidental. Defense Express reported in July 2025 that FP-1 reached its target in Krasnozavodsk, an area within the broader Moscow air defense zone. At the time, analysts concluded that Ukrainian drones had already demonstrated a recurring capability to strike military-industrial facilities in the Moscow region. In this context, the latest incident appears as an extension of the same operational pattern, now reaching closer to Moscow itself.

From depots to Mosfilmovskaya: the evolution of targets

The FP-1 is reported to account for more than 60% of Ukrainian deep-strike operations inside Russian territory. These targets have predominantly included ammunition depots, oil refineries, logistics hubs, command posts, and air defense batteries. This reflects sustained pressure on Russia’s military-industrial infrastructure rather than isolated symbolic actions.

However, a strike reaching Moscow carries a different weight that extends beyond purely military considerations.

For the current Russian political system, the symbolism of the 9 May parade is not merely ceremonial. It functions as a central ritual of legitimacy – an annual reaffirmation of the narrative of the “Great Patriotic War” and the continuity of victory.

A drone bearing Ukrainian markings appearing within a few kilometers of the Ministry of Defense just days before this event therefore takes on an additional dimension. It is not only a tactical incident but also a message, interpreted both inside and outside Moscow.

Even the sudden discussion of a potential “ceasefire for 9 May” may be linked less to diplomatic considerations and more to the practical concern of holding the parade without aerial disruptions over Red Square. In this context, the recent incident reinforces those concerns.

From kamikaze drone to platform: additional capabilities of FP-1

The FP-1 is primarily designed as a strike UAV, but in practice the platform has evolved beyond a single-role definition. Fire Point has reportedly developed a variant of FP-1 as a carrier for FPV interceptor drones. In this configuration, the long-range UAV delivers small FPV systems deep into the rear area, where they detach and engage targets such as aircraft, helicopters, or reconnaissance UAVs.

This approach significantly extends the operational range of FPV drones, which in standard use are typically limited to 10–30 km. With a carrier platform, they can potentially be deployed hundreds of kilometers from the front line, expanding their tactical reach far beyond conventional constraints.

Separately, the platform can be fitted with stabilized machine-gun armament for engaging aerial targets. In future configurations, integration of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) is considered, effectively turning the FP-1 into an unmanned air-defense element. In this role, it could patrol a designated area, detect aerial threats, and engage them autonomously, at least in theory, without an operator being physically present in a high-risk zone.

The company does not develop a separate class of interceptors. Instead, all variants are based on a single platform. This approach is intended to simplify the production chain and avoid multiplying logistical complexity. It reflects the same industrial pragmatism seen in the choice of airframe materials and overall design philosophy.

Contradictions that cannot be avoided

A fair assessment of the FP-1 is not complete without addressing the issues that have accompanied Fire Point’s rapid rise. In August 2025, Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) launched an investigation into the company over alleged overpricing of components or discrepancies in reported delivery volumes. The independent anti-corruption body also called for a parliamentary inquiry. Former drone unit commander Yurii Kasianov publicly stated that Fire Point secured major contracts despite alleged design shortcomings, while competing developments, including his own “Spear” system, were not selected. These claims remain part of an ongoing debate surrounding procurement practices and industrial priorities in Ukraine’s rapidly expanding defense sector.

These allegations cannot be dismissed. Corruption in military procurement during wartime is not an abstract ethical issue; it directly affects combat effectiveness. If drones were delivered in smaller quantities than declared or at inflated prices, accountability is required.

At the same time, the operational facts remain unchanged. The FP-1 was present in Moscow that night, with debris found on Mosfilmovskaya Street and Ukrainian-language markings visible on the wreckage. The NABU investigation is important and necessary, but it does not alter the fact that the drone reached its reported destination.

What this means for the coming week and beyond

With the 9 May parade only days away, Moscow has reportedly begun reinforcing its air defense network. Additional systems are being redeployed to the capital. On the morning of 4 May, operations at Vnukovo and Domodedovo airports were temporarily disrupted due to the “Kovyor” (Carpet) security protocol. At the same time, President Putin proposed a ceasefire around 9 May, a move the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry described as another attempt to “appeal to Americans.” Taken together, these developments indicate a period of heightened security pressure around symbolic and strategic events in Moscow.

All of this together forms a picture in which a symbolic event – the Victory Day parade – also becomes a logistical and security challenge for the Kremlin. The FP-1 will not prevent the parade from taking place. However, it introduces an additional layer of pressure: the awareness that a drone with a plywood airframe, produced by a relatively unconventional defense manufacturer in Kyiv, has already reached the vicinity of Moscow.

A drone with Ukrainian-language markings

The FP-1 is not a perfect weapon. It is relatively expensive compared to its targets in scenarios involving mass deployment of low-cost drones. Each carrier platform has a limited payload capacity, and it cannot independently determine the outcome of the war.

However, it has already altered the operational geometry of the conflict. Before FP-1 was produced in significant numbers, Russia could assume that its strategic depth remained secure. Ammunition depots in the Moscow region, oil refineries located far from the front line, and command posts considered to be in the “safe rear” were largely outside sustained pressure.

This is no longer the case in the same way. With production reportedly reaching around 100 units per day and a unit cost of approximately $55,000, these systems enable persistent long-range strikes against infrastructure previously regarded as insulated from direct attack.

The drone that reached Mosfilmovskaya Street this night is not merely a combat incident or a symbolic action. It is a tangible demonstration that Ukraine has built something that did not exist in 2022: its own long-range strike industry. With its own engines. Its own antennas. Its own airframes made from plywood.

And with markings that were read in Moscow.

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